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This article examines the dynamics of Japanese and Chinese post–Cold War security
policies in East Asia and assesses the implications for regional stability. To this end, the
discussion explores elements in both countries’ security policy behavior, and Sino-
Japanese relations that have a stabilizing and/or destabilizing impact on the region. The
article argues that, on the whole, Japanese and Chinese security policies have contributed
to more stability than instability. Although the security dilemma between Japan (and the
United States) and China may have become more pronounced, the balance of power
currently maintained may be assessed in positive terms for the region. In addition, Sino-
Japanese competition for influence has led to strengthening East Asian institution build-
ing and thereby fostered stability. While there is ground for cautious optimism regarding
the future of Sino-Japanese cooperation, mutual strategic distrust between Tokyo and
Beijing will underpin the security dilemma and their competitive policies in the region.
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Introduction
The contemporary geopolitical and strategic landscape in East Asia1 is shapedby a power shift, unseen in the region’s modern history: the simultaneous
rise of Japan and China. Although Japan in the post–Cold War period has con-
tinued to pursue a foreign policy approach largely based on economic and
nonmilitary instruments of power, it has sought a more “normal” role in East
Asian, as well as global, security affairs.2 Faced with a new military threat from
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and uncer-
tainties about the implications of China’s rise in the long term, Tokyo is seen to
have attached greater importance to strengthening Japan’s defense posture and
security alliance with Washington. Having seen nearly 30 consecutive years of
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spectacular economic growth, China, for its part, has been consolidating its status
as a major regional power by modernizing its armed forces, asserting its territo-
rial claims in East Asia, and enhancing its diplomatic and economic role in the
region. While promoting a defensive image, Beijing has increasingly sought to
undermine U.S. primacy in East Asia, which it considers as a threat to its national
security interests as well as reduce Japan’s regional influence. As Japan and
China each have responded to the new post–Cold War strategic environment in
East Asia by redefining their respective security priorities, mutual suspicion of
the other’s strategic intentions has increased, while rivalry between Tokyo and
Beijing for regional leadership has become more accentuated. In turn, this has
made the question of East Asian stability more relevant than ever.
It is in the context of the above discussion that this article examines the
dynamics of Japanese and Chinese security policies in the region. In particular,
the article explores elements in both countries’ security policy behavior and
Sino-Japanese interactions that could have a stabilizing and/or destabilizing
impact on East Asia. In this way, it seeks to assess the implications for regional
security of Japan’s and China’s adjustment to the post–Cold War strategic
environment.
The article starts by outlining the post–Cold War external and domestic context
of security policy in both countries. The discussion then examines the ways Japan
and China have tackled what each side sees as their respective security
concerns—for Japan, this has been North Korea and increasingly China, while for
China, this concerns the United States and its alliance with Japan. The analysis
underscores the “action-reaction” dynamics between Tokyo and Washington,
and Beijing, by alluding to the emerged security dilemma in East Asia, and by
exploring the recent trend toward military buildup and potential arms race in the
region. The article then goes on to examine the way Tokyo and Beijing have each
promoted regional institution building and thereby contributed to a strengthen-
ing of multilateralism in East Asia. It is argued that whereas in Northeast Asia
recent developments suggest willingness on the part of both Japan and China to
use various fora to jointly address issues of common concern and arguably
alleviate the security dilemma, in the wider Asia-Pacific region and here espe-
cially in Southeast Asia, Japan and China are increasingly seen as pursuing
regional initiatives and using soft power3 in order to compete for influence. The
article concludes by making several observations with regard to the implications
of Japanese and Chinese security policy behavior for stability in East Asia.
The External and Domestic Context of Japanese and
Chinese Security Policies
The structural change in the international system brought about by the end of
the Cold War dramatically altered the strategic perceptions of both Japan and
China. For Japan, North Korea has emerged as its immediate security threat due
to Tokyo’s concerns about the DPRK’s nonconventional military capabilities,
notably Pyongyang’s nuclear program and missiles capable of targeting Japan’s
major cities. Japan has felt intimidated by North Korea’s belligerent behavior
since the 1994 nuclear crisis, and its concerns have arguably intensified in the
wake of the DPRK’s 2006 and 2009 missile launches and nuclear tests.4 Indeed,
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the worries are now that Pyongyang has possibly made progress in developing
smaller nuclear warheads, which could be mounted on ballistic missiles and
hence targeted at Japan. The perceived North Korean security threat is addition-
ally complicated by several cases of Japanese citizens being kidnapped by North
Korean agents along Japan’s coastal areas in the 1970s and 1980s.5 Finally, the
repeated incursions of North Korean spy ships into Japanese territorial
waters—the most dramatic incident being in 2001 when the Japanese Coast
Guard was forced to chase and sink one such vessel—have further contributed to
a significant shift in Japan’s perception of the DPRK.
While North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have become an immediate
catalyst for Tokyo’s redefiniton of its security policy, the rise of China has pre-
sented Japan with additional challenges in the long term. These include concerns
about the modernization of China’s nuclear and missile potential and Beijing’s
strategic intentions in the region. Tokyo is especially worried about the expansion
of China’s naval and air military capabilities, as it would allow Beijing to project
its power into the East and South China Seas, where Japan’s sea lanes of com-
munication (SLOC) stretch. Indeed, for a resource-poor Japan, a resource-hungry
China is a strong competitor over energy supply sources. An example of a
mounting Sino-Japanese rivalry for energy resources is the ongoing territorial
dispute between Japan and China about the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East
China Sea, as it is believed that the waters around the islands contain large oil and
gas reserves.6
As in the case of Japan, the end of the Cold War led to a profound change in
Chinese strategic perceptions. For Beijing, the main question has become how
to deal with U.S. preponderance in East Asia and, by extension, with Japan as
America’s main regional ally. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) external
security concerns have been driven by internal motivations. Indeed, it has been
the priority for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) leadership to preserve
the legitimacy of its regime and ensure domestic political stability by means of
sustained economic growth (Saunders, 2008). Additionally, the perception that
China has a legitimate right to retribution for past “humiliation,” notably
regarding Japan, and the goal of “regaining” lost territories, including Taiwan
and the disputed islands in the East China Sea (Terrill, 2005), have influenced
Beijing’s foreign policy behavior. The overall result has been the PRC’s
increased involvement in East Asian affairs with a view to promoting a
regional environment conducive to the realization of Beijing’s objectives, secur-
ing access to energy resources, and, last but not least, expanding China’s
regional influence.
Beijing’s priorities in East Asia arguably involve achieving a dominant position
vis-à-vis Japan and, perhaps more importantly, reducing America’s influence in
the region, especially in Southeast Asia—what has been called the “Chinese
Monroe Doctrine” (Kurlantzick, 2006; Terrill, 2005). Chinese concerns about a
perceived U.S. hegemonic role in East Asia have been aggravated by Tokyo’s
willingness in the post–Cold War era to strengthen its defense posture and
reinforce the alliance with Washington, thereby assuming a larger regional and
global security role. This security activism of Japan, mostly accentuated during
the term of former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) and referred to
as Japan’s “normalization,” was viewed by Beijing as being channeled through
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a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and encouraged by the George W. Bush
administration (Wu, 2005). It is in this context that the PRC came to perceive
Japan as a major tool in America’s strategy aimed at balancing Chinese power
and maintaining U.S. regional security dominance (Wu, 2005). In turn, this served
to exacerbate Sino-Japanese mutual strategic mistrust, which, as will be discussed
below, was fueled by the changing domestic context of security policy in both
countries.
In Japan, there has been a rightward shift in its domestic politics, which has
been translated into Tokyo’s increased willingness to strengthen Japan’s security
posture and balance (jointly with the United States) the rising power of China.
The 1990s saw the end of the one-party governance of the conservative Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP)7 and the demise of the parliamentary Left. As a strong
supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the postwar period, the LDP’s tradi-
tional emphasis in foreign policy was put on the development of Japanese eco-
nomic power, alignment with the United States, and pursuit of minimal military
rearmament—a strategy known as the “Yoshida Doctrine.” With the rise to
power of more nationalistic and conservative LDP politicians—the most notable
examples being former prime ministers Koizumi, Abe Shinzo (2006–2007), and
Aso Taro (2008–2009)—Japan was seen to attach greater significance to the
strengthening of its defense posture and to the deepening of its security ties with
the United States. In turn, the marginalization of the socialists (a strong advocate
of Japan’s strict adherence toArticle 9 of the postwar Constitution of 1947) meant
that a major constraining force on the LDP’s security ambitions was removed.8
Article 9 increasingly came to be seen by a number of conservative LDP politi-
cians, notably Koizumi and Abe, as a major barrier to a larger, or “normal,”
security role for Japan. Although the majority of the Japanese oppose Article 9
revision, the people have gradually come to accept a strengthened military
posture of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in matters of national defense.9 Indeed,
this is due to the changed threat perceptions, especially the Japanese public’s
increased concern about North Korea and China. The Koizumi factor should not
be underestimated either, as his extraordinary public popularity arguably
enabled him to stimulate enhanced nationalism and boost the “China threat”
view within the Japanese society.
A contributing factor to this conservative shift is the perceived economic
decline of Japan, especially considered against China’s spectacular economic
growth. Indeed, Tokyo’s postwar foreign policy strategy emphasized a compre-
hensive approach to security10 and was largely based on the country’s “ever-
expanding economic muscle” (Pempel, 2007, p. 111). However, Japan’s stagnant
economy in the 1990s and the contrasting growth of its neighbor have stimulated
greater willingness on the part of its political elites to pursue a more assertive
(albeit U.S.-centered) security policy, as well as strengthen Japan’s diplomatic
profile in East Asia.
In China, a major feature of the domestic context of its foreign policy has
been the rise of nationalism. Chinese nationalism has a strong anti-Japanese
component and has been used by the CCP leaders primarily to ensure the
legitimacy of their regime and internal political stability. The rise of nationalism
may be attributed to both historical factors—China’s search for pride and
international recognition given its past “humiliation” by the West and, more
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dramatically, Japan—and ideological changes—progressive evolution in the PRC
from communism to nationalism in an era when communism has lost much of its
appeal after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
As mentioned earlier, domestic stability has been seen by the PRC’s political
elites as being directly linked to the successful achievement of the country’s
primary goal of sustained economic growth. The realization that the “China
threat” perception in East Asia may jeopardize that goal, and hence result in
containment by the United States as well as other Asian countries, has led Beijing
to adopt reassuring policies toward China’s neighbors, including by means of
promoting its image as a benign rising power and improving bilateral ties (Foot,
2006). Such an approach however, has not been successful with regard to the
PRC’s relations with Tokyo, largely due to the domestic sensitivity of the issue of
Japan’s historical legacy in China.
Indeed, bilateral disputes over the interpretation of history during the Koizumi
premiership, especially due to his yearly visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, were at the
bottom of the unprecedented deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations throughout
his term in office. Given that there are 14 Class A war criminals enshrined in
Yasukuni in addition to 2.5 million Japanese soldiers, Beijing regarded Koizumi’s
pilgrimages as an attempt by Japan to legitimize its past aggression and refused
to hold summit meetings with Tokyo. The heightened anti-Japanese public sen-
timent in China was mirrored by increased negative perceptions of the PRC
among the Japanese people. Beijing’s rising military power and especially the
perceived lack of transparency with regard to its national defense policy, as well
as (what has been seen as) its assertiveness in acquiring energy resources in the
disputed waters in the East China Sea, have arguably contributed to apprehen-
sions in Japan of China’s future potential dominance in East Asia. Although
Koizumi’s successors have abstained from visiting the shrine, and Japan’s dip-
lomatic ties with the PRC have improved since 2006, mutual distrust has contin-
ued to define Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, despite the increased economic
interdependence since the 1990s and a number of common interests in East Asia,
Japan and China have viewed one another as strategic rivals rather than partners.
As will be illustrated below, the dynamics of their security policies in the region
have reflected these negative mutual perceptions.
Japanese and Chinese Security Policies in East Asia: Security
Dilemmas and an Arms Race
Mutual suspicion between Japan and China and diverging threat perceptions
have contributed to a more pronounced trend for security dilemmas and have
increased the potential for an arms race in East Asia.
In the case of Japan, its primary focus has been on dealing with the North
Korean military threat and balancing Beijing’s rising power by relying on the
United States. Tokyo has responded to China’s rise with a major adjustment in its
strategy, namely from one based primarily on accommodating the PRC to one
combining economic engagement with balancing (Mochizuki, 2007). The balanc-
ing aspect has been largely represented by strengthening Japan’s alliance with
the United States (external balancing) together with its own military capabilities
(internal balancing).
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China, for its part, has pursued what has been seen as a defensive approach
(Terrill, 2005) driven by domestic considerations, namely the central goal of
economic development. At the same time, this approach is reflecting Beijing’s
search for increased regional (and global) presence in order to facilitate the
achievement of its internal policy objectives. While China has sought to accom-
modate U.S. hegemony, it has also, with focus on the PRC’s interests, hedged
against a possible negative impact of America’s dominance, especially in East
Asia (Foot, 2006). This hedging is to be seen in Beijing’s more active regional
diplomacy (to be discussed later in this article) and, equally important, China’s
focus on strengthening its military capabilities in order to address its core
national security interest (i.e., the Taiwan issue). In this context, developments in
the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese security policy since the 1990s have been
viewed by the PRC as a potential threat to the status quo across the Strait.
Security Dilemmas: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and China
It may be argued that North Korea’s missile and nuclear ambitions have been
at the bottom of a major change in the security dynamics between the U.S.-Japan
alliance and China. The U.S.-Japanese response to the nuclear threat posed by the
North has created a security dilemma between Tokyo and Washington, and
Beijing by having an impact on the Taiwan issue.
For Japan, the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs have been seen as “a
direct threat to peace and stability in the East Asian region, including Japan”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2004, p. 7) and “a destabilizing factor not
only for the Asia-Pacific region but also for the entire international community”
(Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2008, p. 33). Tokyo’s sharpened political rhetoric
toward the North was underscored by describing the 2006 missile launches as “a
matter of grave concern, including from the viewpoint of the security of Japan,
and the peace and stability of the international community” (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan, 2007, pp. 3–4). From a Japanese perspective, therefore, the
strengthening of its alliance with America since the 1990s has been seen as a
necessary means to safeguard its national security interests.
In the wake of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, in 1997 the United States
and Japan revised the bilateral defense guidelines. As the guidelines committed
the SDF to extend noncombat rear-area support to the U.S. military during
regional contingencies, in essence, they broadened the alliance’s scope from a
narrow focus on the defense of Japan (which was the case during the Cold War)
to include regional security crises. The adoption of the guidelines, however,
increased the significance of the Taiwan issue in the relations between China, and
Japan and the United States, and arguably the potential for regional instability.
Some Chinese officials expressed concern that while Tokyo and Washington saw
the guidelines as “safeguarding regional security,” the new agreement would in
fact “threaten the peace and stability of the region” (“China Slams,” 1999). In
particular, the ambiguous concept “situations in areas surrounding Japan” men-
tioned in the guidelines created apprehension in Beijing that a Taiwan conflict
would fall within the remit of U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Although both
U.S. and Japanese officials argued that the phrase had a “situational” and not a
“geographical” interpretation, the refusal by Tokyo and Washington to explicitly
rule Taiwan in or out was essentially perceived by Beijing as an interference in
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cross-Strait relations (Green, 2003). To be sure, the revision of the guidelines took
place after the 1995 Chinese nuclear tests and the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.
Accordingly, while China used the 1996 missile tests to maintain what it regarded
as the status quo, by seeking to prevent Taiwanese independence, Japan and the
United States reinforced their stance on the status quo by strengthening the
alliance in the face of the looming North Korean threat (Green, 2003), but argu-
ably also in response to Beijing’s more assertive behavior. As far as Sino-Japanese
relations are concerned, it is since the mid-1990s that mutual strategic mistrust
has become a major driving force of their interactions, underscoring the presence
of a security dilemma and hence having a potentially negative impact on stability
in East Asia.
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the
unprecedented strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance under the Bush-Koizumi
partnership highlighted the strategic convergence of the two allies on traditional
security issues. However, this had an adverse effect on Beijing’s security percep-
tions, as it deepened Chinese suspicion about potential U.S.-Japanese contain-
ment. Here, the domestic politics factor was also clearly at work. In Japan, this
was the rightward shift in its security orientation and the parallel strengthening
of the “China threat” perception among the Japanese people stimulated by
Koizumi-like conservative LDP politicians. Indeed, the 2004 National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG) adopted by the Koizumi administration mentioned
for the first time in a Japanese national security doctrine two specific countries as
Japan’s key security concerns, namely North Korea and China (Prime Minister of
Japan and His Cabinet, 2004). In the meantime, as in China communist ideology
proved insufficient to the PRC’s leaders as a source of legitimacy in the post–
Cold War period, the CCP continued to feed nationalism among the people while
tolerating anti-Japan sentiments. Japan’s treatment of the history issue under
Koizumi and what was perceived as a move away from its postwar pacifism
provided Beijing with the context for singling out Japan’s foreign policy actions
as “a cause of serious concern” for the international community (Chinese Gov-
ernment’s Official Web Portal, 2005).
A strong proponent of a strengthened military alliance with Washington and
more assertive Japanese security policy, Koizumi dispatched the SDF on noncom-
bat missions to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, respectively. While these deployments
demonstrated Tokyo’s commitment to support its U.S. ally in the “war on terror,”
they also indicated Koizumi’s ambitions for Japan’s expanded international secu-
rity presence. Indeed, according to the 2004 NDPG, Japan would now “improve
the international security environment” as part of its defense policy (Prime Min-
ister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2004). Arguably in line with the security ambitions
of Koizumi and his conservative LDP, while at the same time reflecting the Bush
administration’s focus on strengthening its military partnership with Tokyo,
the scope of the alliance was broadened as well. This was clear from the 2005
joint report entitled U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the
Future, which introduced an aspect of global cooperation to the bilateral security
framework (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2005).
The PRC sharply criticized Japan’s security activism under Koizumi. Driven by
strong anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiments and to the extent of greatly exagger-
ating, Chinese analysts repeatedly expressed worries about Japan’s alleged
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reemergence as a major military power, thereby contributing to souring Sino-
Japanese relations (Yahuda, 2006). The LDP’s moves to revise Article 9 were seen
by many observers in China as an indicator for a growing political conservatism
in Japan (Wu, 2005), which further fueled suspicion regarding Tokyo’s strategic
intentions. China argued that the trend in Japanese security policy raised the
question whether Japan would continue pursuing its postwar peaceful develop-
ment policy or would instead once again follow the path of expansionism
(“Japan’s ‘Sense of Crisis,’ ” 2005).
It was the Taiwan issue, however, that was of the utmost concern to China.
Indeed, Beijing’s fears of the alliance’s interference in cross-Strait relations were
exacerbated by a 2005 U.S.-Japanese statement that indicated the “peaceful reso-
lution” of the Taiwan Strait issue as one of their “common strategic objectives” in
the region (United States Department of State, 2005). In this regard, Premier Wen
Jiabao stressed that Japan should adhere to the “one China” principle, while the
security alliance was a bilateral arrangement (“Premier Wen,” 2005). He also
pointed out that the Chinese people regarded the alliance as interfering in the
PRC’s domestic affairs, something Beijing would not tolerate (“Premier Wen,”
2005). China retaliated by enacting the Anti-Secession Law soon after the U.S.-
Japanese joint statement was issued. Beijing stated its position in Article 8 of the
law, underscoring the possibility of a military action in case Taiwan declared its
independence. Indeed, the law explicitly indicated the PRC’s intention to employ
“non-peaceful means” in order to “protect China’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity” (National People’s Congress, PRC, 2005) and thereby prevent a change
in the status quo across the Strait.
The Taiwan issue represents a complicated factor in Japan-China security rela-
tions. For Japan, a potential cross-Strait conflict between the United States and the
PRC over the island would mean that Tokyo would be pressed to make tough
choices concerning its involvement. In turn, Japan’s decisions would inevitably
have a profound impact on both the U.S.-Japan alliance and Sino-Japanese rela-
tions. Taiwan’s relevance for Japan’s national security has also a geopolitical
dimension, due to the island’s location close to Japan’s SLOCs, which are vital for
its economy. Arguably, this feeds Beijing’s suspicion about Tokyo’s real motives
behind the strengthening of its security ties with Washington, as a unified China
might be seen as a challenge to Japan’s strategic interests in the Western Pacific.
Indeed, analysts point out that the PRC’s recent expansion of its naval power is
part of a broader strategy, which seeks the establishment of Chinese maritime
dominance over the Western Pacific (Minemura, 2009).
As far as the PRC’s relations with the United States are concerned, the Taiwan
issue remains a major (if not the major) factor that determines their stability.
While the United States is a power that can further Chinese foreign policy goals,
it is at the same time also perceived by many Chinese as a threat to the
internal stability of their country (F. L. Wang, 2009; J. Wang, 2005). In this context,
America’s policy on Taiwan, aimed at maintaining peace in the Strait and deter-
ring China from a forceful unification with the island (but also Taiwan from
unilaterally changing the status quo), has raised questions in Beijing. Indeed,
Chinese White Papers on Defense have repeatedly criticized the United States for
selling advanced weapons to Taiwan and strengthening its military ties with the
island (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2004, 2006, 2008).
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China has urged Washington to strictly adhere to a “one China” policy and has
emphasized the destabilizing impact of U.S. actions on cross-Strait relations.
Moreover, it is also beyond question that a military confrontation over the island
would have major repercussions for regional stability.
Military Buildup and a Potential Arms Race in the Region
The “action-reaction dynamics” between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China
observed above are also evident in recent trends toward military buildups, which
suggest a potential arms race in the region (Yamamoto, 2008). Specifically, this
concerns new missile deployments by China, the joint U.S.-Japanese develop-
ment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, and the increased activism in
space by Japan and China.
In the case of China, it has focused its efforts on attaining military superiority
with regard to Taiwan, as well as on deterring the United States (and Japan) from
helping Taipei achieve independence. While pursuing economic interdepen-
dence with the island and emphasizing the benefits of economic integration,
Beijing has sought a more coercive approach to the reunification issue by means
of reinforcing Chinese military capabilities and becoming more serious about the
use of force (as seen in its adoption of theAnti-Secession Law). In this context, the
PRC’s modernization of its nuclear and missile arsenal has been particularly
important. Some observers point out China’s plans to deploy ballistic missiles
with nonnuclear warheads and special guidance systems to hit aircraft carriers
and warships far from its shores. Such moves would raise the stakes for a possible
external intervention (by the United States and Japan) in a Taiwan crisis or any
other regional conflict involving China (Richardson, 2009). China’s rapid devel-
opment and deployment since the mid-1990s of short- and intermediate-range
missiles has already increased its ability of striking not only Taiwan, but also
other targets in East Asia, including Japan and some of the main U.S. military
bases in the region. Not surprisingly, and seen as a defensive measure from a
Japanese perspective, this has triggered a response from Tokyo. Indeed, the 2007
Japanese White Paper on Defense expressed worries that Beijing’s military mod-
ernization could be aiming at something more than the mere resolution of the
Taiwan issue (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2007).
It should be stressed that Japan’s main incentive to seek acquisition of new
military capabilities has been the DPRK’s provocative behavior from the early
1990s onward and a perceived need for Tokyo to deter Pyongyang from engaging
in military actions. However, the rise of Chinese military power has acted as an
additional stimulus for Tokyo to seek a strengthening of its own defense capa-
bilities. The changed domestic context of foreign policy has also facilitated this
process. Indeed, some LDP politicians, especially Koizumi and his successor,
Abe, arguably used the presence of new threats in East Asia and domestic
sentiments favoring “normalization” to augment Japan’s military power and
expand its security role (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2010).
Japan’s decision to engage with the United States in joint research on BMD was
a direct response to the 1998 North Korean missile launch. Until the 1998 launch,
Tokyo refrained from making a formal commitment to joint development out of
consideration for Beijing’s concerns that a U.S.-Japanese BMD system (especially
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a mobile and sea-based one) could neutralize Chinese nuclear deterrents and be
used for the defense of Taiwan (Green, 2003). The launch heightened the security
concerns in Japan and acted as a catalyst for a deepening of U.S.-Japan coopera-
tion on BMD. In the wake of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002–2003,
Koizumi sought to accelerate the introduction of U.S.-made missile defense
systems in late 2003, with the first systems deployed during the term of Abe. The
introduction of BMD systems was viewed in positive terms by the general public,
with 57% of the Japanese polled in 2006 supporting such a defense capability
(Japan Cabinet Office, 2006). For China, however, these developments only
served to deepen its suspicion about the real strategic intentions of Tokyo and
Washington, especially concerning Taiwan. Furthermore, if Japan and the United
States, but also potentially Taiwan, deploy BMD systems in the future, the PRC
may seek a significant strengthening of its own missile arsenal and acquisition
of a defense system in order to maintain its strike capabilities (Yamamoto, 2008).
In turn, this would only exacerbate the “security dilemma” in the region
(Yamamoto, 2008). Nevertheless, until now, China’s nuclear modernization has
been rather moderate, focused more on a qualitative than a quantitative upgrade,
which suggests that Beijing has sought not to provoke such a dilemma.
The increased space activism and use of space for national security purposes by
Japan and China also illustrate the recent trend toward a potential arms race in
East Asia. In the same way as Japan’s decision for acquisition of BMD systems
was triggered by the 1998 North Korean missile launch, Tokyo’s decision in 1998
to establish its own spy satellite program and to deploy from 2003 onward four
reconnaissance satellites was underpinned by a perceived threat from the DPRK.
However, Beijing’s approach to space development as an essential part of its
national security strategy has arguably stimulated Tokyo’s own ambitions. Since
the start of the 2000s, China has developed and deployed a number of different
types of satellites, thereby significantly improving its capabilities in this area. In
2005, China successfully put in orbit a manned spacecraft and in 2007 demon-
strated its ability to destroy its own satellite with a ground-based ballistic missile.
One month after China’s successful antisatellite test, Japan deployed its fourth
spy satellite.
Indeed, Japan did not wait to be left lagging behind the PRC. A turning point
in Japan’s space policy was the decision by the government of Fukuda Yasuo
(2007–2008) to enact a bill that allowed the use of space for defensive purposes.
The new law opened up the way for Japan’s acquisition of early-warning satellites
to detect missile launches. Under Prime Minister Aso, Tokyo advanced further in
its space development policy for national security purposes, with the country’s
first space policy plan finalized in April 2009. Not surprisingly, it came in the
wake of North Korea’s launch of a long-range rocket the same month.
China, for its part, reportedly plans to accelerate its space development
program, most notably by means of launching an unmanned lunar probe project
by 2013 and constructing a space station by 2020. This arguably has had an
immediate impact on Japan, as a government panel of Democratic Party of
Japan’s (DPJ’s) Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009–present)11 has reportedly
embarked on discussing a proposal for the construction of a Japanese robot-
operated base on the moon’s south pole by 2020 (“Lunar Probe,” 2009). The
PRC’s development of sophisticated space technology and its growing presence
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in space, and Japan’s increased focus on space exploration in recent years do not
in themselves mean an arms race in space. Nevertheless, as the development of
sophisticated space technologies, such as reconnaissance satellites, embodies a
military dimension, this recent trend in Chinese and Japanese security policies
suggests that military competition in space may not be impossible to imagine in
the not so distant future.
Japanese and Chinese Security Policies in East Asia:
Regional Cooperation and Sino-Japanese Rivalry
In comparison to Japan’s strategy based on an “America first, Asia second”
approach (Yamamoto, 2008, p. 22), China’s foreign policy strategy from the late
1990s on has emphasized the promotion of multilateralism in East Asia.
Beijing’s participation in various regional institutional arrangements has formed
part of its “reassurance campaign” (Saunders, 2008), aimed at reducing the
“China threat” perception and, linked to it, apprehension in the region regard-
ing the PRC’s rising (military) power. Especially in Southeast Asia, China has
utilized multilateralism in combination with other soft power tools. At the same
time, however, Beijing’s active promotion of cooperation in regional fora
reveals its perception of vulnerability in East Asia. This vulnerability stems
from the unresolved Taiwan issue, as well as the need for the CCP leaders to
promote regional stability in order to maintain the country’s high levels of
economic growth. In this context, Beijing is seen to pursue a diplomatic strat-
egy in East Asia in order to increase its influence and hedge vis-à-vis the
United States (and Japan).
Although Tokyo’s foreign policy since the 1990s has, indeed, remained cen-
tered on bilateralism with the United States placing especially under Koizumi a
stronger emphasis on the military instruments of power, Japan’s regional strat-
egy has significantly relied on soft power. Japan has been a major aid donor to
Southeast Asian countries and an active supporter of regional institution build-
ing, which has represented a continuity of Tokyo’s comprehensive approach to
security since the Cold War era (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2010). That approach has
reflected Japanese willingness to ensure East Asian stability by means of coop-
eration and deepened interdependence. Further, participation in various minilat-
eral12 and multilateral fora has provided Tokyo with opportunities to pursue a
policy of engagement, which has been described as a “key pillar” of its regional
strategy (Yoshihara, 2008). Indeed, this has been Japan’s preferred approach
toward the PRC and the DPRK. Finally, as noted by some observers (e.g., Mulgan,
2005; Pempel, 2007), Chinese multilateral activism and competition for regional
leadership with Beijing are seen to encourage Tokyo to raise its own diplomatic
profile in East Asia and promote regional institution building.
Northeast Asia: Multilateralism With Little
Sino-Japanese Cooperation
Northeast Asian multilateralism has arguably been underpinned by the
common concern in the region about North Korea’s nuclear program, which has
drawn Japan, China, the United States, as well as South Korea (and Russia) closer
together.
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In the case of Japan, it has actively utilized minilateral and multilateral fora to
address the denuclearization of the DPRK, thereby pursuing its traditional policy
of engagement toward Pyongyang (Hughes, 2005). To be sure, Tokyo’s approach
toward North Korea has hardened due to the politically sensitive abductee issue,
which has become a major reason for Japan to refuse economic aid to and impose
economic sanctions on the North. Nevertheless, Japan has supported a multilat-
eral engagement of the DPRK and has participated in the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO),13 the Trilateral Coordination and
Oversight Group (TCOG) (with the United States and the Republic of Korea
[ROK]), and the six-party talks. Furthermore, North Korea’s military ambitions
have provided the context for Japan and South Korea to intensify their security
ties. Since the 1990s, Tokyo and Seoul have expanded their joint military exercises
and coordinated, along with Washington, their policies toward Pyongyang in the
TCOG framework. That policy coordination has been important for strengthen-
ing the trilateral Japan-U.S.-ROK relations.
Beijing, for its part, has been primarily concerned about the negative conse-
quences of a potential military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula for its
stability and the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime.14 China has disagreed with
the policy of pressure and sanctions against Pyongyang, thus pursuing an
approach close to the South Korean position (especially under Roh Moo-hyun),
according to which the best way to get out of the nuclear quagmire is through
diplomatic means and strengthened inter-Korean economic ties (Lee, 2005). For
Beijing, the need for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean issue has given a
major impetus to promoting regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
Indeed, the six-party talks, which commenced in 2003 and were the result of
Chinese diplomatic efforts, have emerged as a major multilateral framework in
the region for addressing the denuclearization of the DPRK.
So far, however, that forum has not succeeded in achieving its goal.15 Further-
more, the withdrawal of North Korea from the six-party talks in April 2009 and
its subsequent insistence on direct negotiations with the United States and pro-
posal for peace talks as a precondition to its return to the stalled dialogue in early
2010 have suggested a rather uncertain future for this multilateral framework.
While it seems difficult to deny that Pyongyang has been in the driver’s seat in
this forum, the six-party talks had an unintended positive impact on the relations
among the Northeast Asian states.
Indeed, the six-party talk framework has played a role in “avoiding the ‘secu-
rity dilemma’ between the DPRK and the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coalition”
(Yamamoto, 2008, p. 26). The presence of such a dilemma would strengthen
China’s perception, in particular, of U.S.-Japan security cooperation as a threat to
Beijing’s interests with regard to Taiwan. The six-party talks have also had a
positive impact on U.S.-China and China-South Korea relations, stimulating
improved bilateral relations. Beijing’s cooperation in the six-party talks has been
of crucial importance to Washington, as China now may be regarded as the “sole
supporter” of North Korea’s economy and Kim Jong-il’s regime (F. L. Wang,
2009). The importance attached by the United States to the North Korean nuclear
issue and Washington’s dependence on Beijing for its resolution provide China
with bargaining power (Mahbubani, 2005), especially with regard to the Taiwan
question: China cooperates with the United States on North Korea in return for
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U.S. nonsupport for Taiwanese independence. As far as South Korea is con-
cerned, the convergence of its preference for engagement toward the North with
China’s policy of diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue has arguably drawn
the ROK closer to Beijing. Finally, in the wake of the DPRK’s nuclear test in 2006,
the probability of an arms race in Northeast Asia has emerged as a source of
common concern for Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, leading to expectations for a
strengthened trilateral cooperation, at least, in the short term (Zissis, 2006). Nev-
ertheless, as far as Japan and China are concerned, there is a lack of coordination
between both governments on North Korea (Yahuda, 2006), despite the commit-
ment of both sides to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, as well as their
strong support for the six-party talks as the main mechanism of negotiation. The
talks may not continue in the future and it is doubtful whether they will achieve
the desired goal of North Korea’s denuclearization; still, the possibility of another
multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia emerging from these talks
should not be excluded. Indeed, a new framework could provide opportunities
for Japan and China to strengthen their cooperation on less sensitive, nontradi-
tional security issues and thereby enhance regional institution building.
It should be stressed that the past couple of years have already seen greater
willingness on the part of both Tokyo and Beijing to engage in closer collabora-
tion on issues of common concern. An important factor for this has been the
reduction of Japan’s bilateral tensions with the PRC, and the ROK for that matter,
over the “history issue” in the post-Koizumi era. Former Japanese Prime Minister
Fukuda, in particular, advocated the strengthening of Tokyo’s diplomatic ties
with Beijing and Seoul and succeeded in reaching an agreement with them on the
launch of an annual trilateral summit meeting independently of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summits. Based on a Japanese proposal,
three-way talks among Japan, the PRC, and the ROK have been held since 1999 on
the sidelines of ASEAN+3 (APT) summits. At the time, Beijing was reportedly
reluctant to accept Tokyo’s proposal for an independent summit, taking into
consideration Pyongyang’s wariness about such an exclusivist framework
(Funatsuki & Endo, 2008). Common concerns, such as natural disasters and
pandemic diseases, have understandably brought the three neighbors together,
and the first such summit took place in Japan in December 2008. It is hoped that
the new framework will help Japan, China, and the ROK jointly tackle the various
regional issues and promote regional integration in the economic area. This
framework is also likely to provide a venue, especially for Tokyo and Beijing, for
fostering mutual strategic trust, the lack of which remains a major challenge to
regional stability.
Finally, given the suitability of minilateralism for addressing “hard” security
issues, both Japan and China are seen to have sought the establishment of a
trilateral policy dialogue with the United States. Japan was the initiator of what
became in 1998 Track II three-way consultations among Tokyo, Beijing, and
Washington. China, for its part, proposed the establishment of a trilateral frame-
work at a senior official level during the George W. Bush administration; the first
such meeting was planned for July 2009. The discussions were supposed to focus
on various issues of common concern, including climate change and energy
security, as well as the overall economic and political situation in East Asia. The
talks were postponed, however, reportedly due to China’s worries that such a
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meeting would anger North Korea given the tensions following the North’s
missile and nuclear tests in 2009 (“China Puts Brakes,” 2009). Although doubts
have been raised concerning the likelihood of such a trilateral dialogue emerging
as a significant security mechanism in Northeast Asia (Jian, 2009), such an
attempt indicates willingness on the part of China and Japan to alleviate the
security dilemma and build trust.
Southeast Asia: Multilateralism, Soft Power, and
Sino-Japanese Rivalry
Tokyo and Beijing have participated in various multilateral institutions and
dialogues beyond the Northeast Asian region.
Japan has pointed out that the primary objective of its diplomacy in the wider
Asia-Pacific is “to forge a stable and prosperous region in which long-term
predictability is ensured” through mutual understanding and cooperation (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2009). In order to promote regional cooperation in
the security field, Japan has played an important role in establishing the main
security framework in the widerAsia-Pacific region, namely theASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF). Convened for the first time in 1994, the ARF was partly based on
a 1991 proposal by Tokyo to create a region-wide security dialogue centered on
theASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. While Tokyo’s proposal and, in turn, the
ARF reflected Japan’s hope for regional stability by means of building mutual
trust and preventing misunderstandings, the motivation to engage China was
clearly an important one for Japan (Berger, 2004). In line with Japan’s regional
objectives, the ARF has envisaged the development of security cooperation in
three stages, namely from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and,
finally, to resolution of conflicts. In part because of Beijing’s opposition, the forum
has failed so far to institutionalize that process and has thus remained limited in
its ability to tackle serious security issues, especially in Northeast Asia.
In recent years, China, for its part, has stressed the “great importance” it
attaches to the role of the ARF for regional stability, emphasizing its commitment
to the forum’s further development and calling for the enhancement of mutual
trust (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2004, 2006, 2008). Beijing
has hosted within theARF framework seminars on cooperation on nontraditional
security issues and held meetings on disaster relief and counterterrorism.
China’s increased participation in various multilateral organizations in the wider
Asian region, including the ARF, has been part of its diplomatic efforts aimed at
reassuring its neighbors of Beijing’s benign intentions (Saunders, 2008). At the
same time, the PRC’s multilateral engagement of Asian states has provided it
with opportunities to expand its regional influence and thereby limit the risk of
being contained by a U.S.-led “coalition,” while moving forward in pursuing
military modernization. In order to reduce the suspicion in East Asia concerning
the PRC’s steadily rising military budget, Beijing has promoted a defensive image
by stressing that China “will not pose a military threat to any other country”
(Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2006), launching new security
concepts, such as “peaceful development,” and increasing its military transpar-
ency. The latter has included the publication of biannual White Papers on China’s
National Defense.
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The respective promotion by Japan and China of regional cooperation beyond
the field of security, into the political and economic areas, and their rivalry for
influence have been most pronounced in Southeast Asia. In this context, both
Tokyo and Beijing have opted for soft power in order to secure regional influence.
Japan’s main approach to Southeast Asia has been one of provision of Official
Development Assistance (ODA). Together with investment, Tokyo’s foreign aid
was an important driver of East Asia’s industrialization during the Cold War and
ensured Japan’s regional economic leadership (Pempel, 2007). For Tokyo, foreign
aid has been directly linked to Japan’s comprehensive interpretation of security
since the postwar years, as well as to its promotion of “human security” objec-
tives in East Asia and globally.16 Having emerged at the end of the 1990s as one
of the global leaders in advocating human security, Japan under Koizumi revised
its ODA charter in 2003 and indicated human security as one of the “basic
policies” in its ODA policy. Indeed, Tokyo has been a primary aid donor to
Southeast Asian nations, including Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Japan has extended ODA to these countries to support their economic and social
development and to alleviate regional disparities. As the provision of foreign aid
by Japan “has generated economic growth and jobs” in the region, Tokyo is seen
to have “enhanced human security (in terms of health and wealth)” for many
people in Southeast Asia (Lam, 2006, p. 149). Japan’s human security role in the
region has also included, among others, peacemaking and peacebuilding initia-
tives and humanitarian relief missions (Lam, 2006).
Beijing, for its part, has pursued an approach to Southeast Asia that reflects the
emphasis the PRC places on economic growth as a means of achieving internal
stability and, more recently, on soft power as a way of expanding its influence. The
general acceptance in Southeast Asia (and Northeast Asia, for that matter) of the
growing importanceofChinamaybe largely attributed to its economicgrowthand
the benefits reaped from it, as the PRC has become a major driving force of the
region’s economic development. Furthermore, since the late 1990s China has
actively used several policy tools to strengthen its soft power in Southeast Asia,
including increased aid, public diplomacy (e.g., establishingConfucius institutes),
and promotion of free trade agreements (FTAs; Kurlantzick, 2006). Beijing’s
diplomatic efforts have been rather successful, as the leaders of Southeast Asia no
longer question the emergence of China (Kurlantzick, 2006).
The enhanced regional influence of the PRC, however, has naturally worried
Tokyo. As pointed out by Mulgan (2005), Japan has traditionally (arguably in East
Asia) been a source of soft power by virtue of its democratic political system,
economic development model, and low (until recently) military profile. As stated
above, Japan’s foreign aid has been a major policy tool in its Southeast Asia
diplomacy. However, due to financial constraints, Japan has since 2000 gradually
decreased its ODA not only in Southeast Asia but also globally. As a result, after
being the world’s top donor of aid for 10 consecutive years, Tokyo moved down
to fifth place in 2007.17 This constituted one of the examples of the perceived
decline of Japan’s economic power, affecting Tokyo’s leadership position in the
region and arguably fueling the rivalry with China.
Sino-Japanese rivalry has led to the “action-reaction” dynamics in Tokyo’s
and Beijing’s respective policies in Southeast Asia. Largely in response to
China’s active engagement of ASEAN in the 1990s, Tokyo in 1997 proposed to
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institutionalize the Japan-ASEAN dialogue. This was a demonstration of Japanese
willingness to strengthen its Southeast Asia diplomacy and to play a more active
role in the region. Beijing, on the other hand, promoted the formalization of the
“Asians only” APT process, launched in 1998. Japan has been very active in that
grouping and supported, for example, the 2000 ChiangMai Initiative for currency
swaps. Nevertheless, since Tokyo was concerned that Washington’s exclusion
from theAPT would open up the way for Beijing to expand its economic influence
and leadership in regional institution building, Japan under Koizumi sought to
keepChinese ambitions in checkby supporting themembershipofAustralia,New
Zealand, and India in the new East Asia Summit (Mochizuki, 2007).
Similarly, Beijing’s expansion of its ASEAN engagement through a proposal in
2001 for anASEAN-China FTA and a decision in 2003 to sign the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC) as the first non-ASEAN member left Tokyo lagging
behind. The Koizumi administration, however, countered China’s regional activ-
ism by announcing in 2004 that Japan would join the TAC and by launching
negotiations for an ASEAN-Japan FTA in 2005. While the recent “race” for con-
cluding bilateral FTAs in the wider Asia-Pacific region is seen to be led by Beijing
(Pempel, 2007), it was Tokyo that in the late 1990s was the first to initiate regional
FTA negotiations and in 2002 signed its first-ever agreement with Singapore.
Conclusion
This article has examined the dynamics of Japanese and Chinese security
policies in the region by focusing on elements in both countries’ security policy
behavior and in Sino-Japanese interactions that have a stabilizing and/or desta-
bilizing impact on East Asia. Several observations may be made with regard to
the implications for regional security.
First, as each side has taken steps to reinforce its respective stance on the status
quo and thereby adjust to the post–Cold War strategic environment, the trend for
a security dilemma in East Asia has been accentuated between Tokyo and Wash-
ington, on the one hand, and Beijing, on the other. Japan has responded to the
North Korean nuclear threat and sought to balance China by means of strength-
ening its security ties with the United States together with its own defense
posture. Beijing, however, has seen the reinforcement of the alliance as a poten-
tial threat to its core national security interest (i.e., the Taiwan issue). The PRC has
focused on military modernization in order to deter Taiwan from moving toward
independence, as well as to raise the stakes for a potential U.S.-Japanese involve-
ment in what is regarded by the PRC as a domestic matter. The lack of strategic
trust between Japan and China has fed the security dilemma, which is also
noticeable in the recent trend toward an arms race in East Asia.
Second, while the present framework of major power relations may have a
destabilizing effect on East Asian security in the long run, notably in the case of a
Sino-Japanese or U.S.-China conflict, the balance of power currently maintained
may be assessed in positive terms with regard to regional stability. In this
context, Japan’s willingness to enhance its regional role, namely in the Korean and
Taiwan Strait theaters, has strengthened the deterring effect of the U.S. forward
deployment in East Asia and hence should be seen as positive for counterbalanc-
ing a rising China (Mulgan, 2005; Yoshihara, 2008). Furthermore, as the Southeast
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Asian countries remainwary of the PRC’s future strategic trajectory, a “diplomatic
balance” between Tokyo and Beijing rather than “unilateral Chinese influence”
(Mulgan, 2005, p. 112) remains the most preferred option in the region as a whole.
Finally, that “diplomatic balance” is already visible in the post–Cold War
trends toward regional cooperation and multilateralism in East Asia. For Tokyo,
its support for institution building, pursuit of economic diplomacy, and promo-
tion of deepened interdependence have been an expression of Japan’s peaceful
foreign policy approach pursued since the postwar years. For Beijing, its active
engagement of SoutheastAsia and increased involvement in regional multilateral
fora have served as a means to ease the worries in East Asia about China’s
potential emergence as a hostile power and promote its “peaceful rise.” Further,
while Japan and China each have used soft power tools to compete for regional
influence, this competition has arguably contributed to strengthening East Asian
institution building and hence fostered stability. Yet, the striking feature of
that multilateralism is its failure to encourage cooperation between Tokyo and
Beijing (Yahuda, 2006). They have arguably continued to perceive one another as
strategic rivals rather than partners, although recent trends in Northeast Asian
minilateralism raise hopes for cautious optimism regarding the future of Sino-
Japanese cooperation and hence East Asian stability.
This optimism is also based on the latest developments in regional relations,
especially in Northeast Asia. In the first place, the policies of the new DPJ
administration of Prime Minister Hatoyama suggest that Japan is somewhat
distancing itself from its traditional U.S.-centrism in foreign policy. Hatoyama has
called for a more “equal” alliance with Washington and has signaled his willing-
ness to revise some of the major security agreements between Japan and the
United States.18 Instead, he has emphasized the strengthening of Tokyo’s ties with
Beijing and Seoul, as well as advocated the formation of an “East Asian commu-
nity.” This is likely to open up the way for a further deepening of regional
cooperation, especially inNortheastAsia, and alleviation of the security dilemma.
To be sure, as of early 2010 it is still premature to evaluate the impact of Hatoya-
ma’s policies on regional relations or theU.S-Japan alliance. Second, the improved
ties between the PRC and Taiwan in the post-Chen Shui-bian periodmean that the
Taiwan issue has become less of a point of instability in China’s relations with the
United States and Japan in the short term. This is not to say that tensions between
Beijing and Washington, and Tokyo may not arise over other issues (e.g., Tibet in
the case of the former and the disputed islands in the East China Sea in the case
of the latter). These are likely to be manageable, however, given the fact that the
present administrations in all three capitals strongly emphasize their willingness
tomaintain positive bilateral (and trilateral) relations. Finally, as theNorthKorean
nuclear issue continues to drag on, it increasingly necessitates a collaborative and
coordinated response on the part of all actors in NortheastAsia. Japan’s increased
emphasis on its Asian diplomacy and China’s determination to push forward a
mutually beneficial relationshipwith Tokyomean that amajor obstacle to regional
cooperation may have been removed, a least for now.
The cautious optimism regarding East Asian stability outlined above is tem-
pered by a realistic assessment of the mutual Sino-Japanese perceptions. Indeed,
the lack of strategic trust between the two East Asian powers remains, underpin-
ning the security dilemma inNortheastAsia, as well as the competitive policies of
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Tokyo and Beijing in Southeast Asia. For the time being, therefore, the following
Chinese assessment seems an apt description of East Asian (in-)stability:
Major powers are stepping up their efforts to cooperate with each other [but
they] continue to compete with and hold each other in check. . . . All countries
are attaching more importance to supporting diplomatic struggles with military
means. . . . The Asia-Pacific security situation is stable on the whole. . . . How-
ever, there still exist many factors of uncertainty in [the region]. (Information
Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2008)
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Notes
1For the purposes of this article, East Asia is defined as comprising Northeast Asia (Japan, China,
the two Koreas, and Taiwan), Southeast Asia (ASEAN-10), and the United States as the primary
extraterritorial actor.
2For a detailed analysis of Japan’s security normalization, see Hughes (2005).
3As defined by Nye (2003, p. 66), “soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than
coerce” and “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”
Kurlantzick (2006) notes that Nye’s original definition was more limited in scope, excluding, for
example, foreign aid and investment, and formal diplomacy. In the Asian context, soft power has
become a more encompassing concept and is seen to include all forms of exercising influence outside
the area of (hard) security (Kurlantzick, 2006).
4In July 2006, North Korea fired seven missiles, which all landed in the Sea of Japan, and in October
of the same year conducted its first nuclear test. InApril 2009, it fired a Taepodong-2 long-range missile
(under the guise of a satellite launch) and in May 2009 conducted a second nuclear test.
5In 2002, Kim Jong-il admitted to then–Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro that the DPRK
had indeed abducted Japanese citizens, which influenced the public’s subsequent support for Abe
Shinzo’s “hard-line” policy on the North. While Pyongyang regards the abductees issue as closed,
Tokyo demands further explanation about the kidnapped Japanese citizens and claims that the
number of abductees was higher than originally admitted by the North in 2002. As a result, this issue
remains a major obstacle to the normalization of Japan’s diplomatic relations with the DPRK.
6For an examination of the territorial dispute, see Drifte (2008).
7The LDP’s one-party rule from 1955 to 1993 is known as the “1955 political system.”
8Article 9, also known as the “peace clause,” renounces the use of military force as a legitimate
instrument of statecraft and commits Japan to nonpossession of war potential. The official government
interpretation ofArticle 9 is that Japan is permitted to maintain only the minimum level of armed force
necessary for self-defense but is prohibited from exercising its right to collective self-defense.
9On Japanese public opinion concerning the use of force and the SDF overseas dispatch in the “war
on terror,” see Midford (2006).
10In contrast to the traditional conceptualization of security in military terms, comprehensive
security goes beyond the military dimension to include economic, social, political, and environmental
aspects of national security.
11In the latest Lower House elections in Japan, which took place at the end of August 2009, the
opposition DPJ achieved a landslide victory. However, the declining approval ratings of the
Hatoyama administration and the forthcoming Upper House elections make the future of the new
government rather uncertain.
12Minilateralism has become an important characteristic of Asian multilateralism since the late
1990s. The term refers to security fora or dialogues, which have three of four participants, are usually
conducted on an ad hoc basis, and primarily deal with traditional security issues (Cha, 2003).
Cases in point are the U.S-Japan-ROK and U.S-Japan-Australia trilateral consultations, as well as the
four-party talks among the United States, China, the ROK, and the DPRK, which took place at the end
of the 1990s (in essence, being the predecessor of the six-party talks).
13KEDO’s activities have been suspended since May 2006 due to a lack of progress on North
Korea’s de-nuclearization.
14China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula has been described as “no unification, no nukes” (see
F. L. Wang, 2009).
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15An analysis of the six-party talks goes beyond the scope of this article. For a concise examination
of the perspectives of the six participating states, see De Ceuster and Melissen (2008).
16On the Japanese approach to human security, see Atanassova-Cornelis (2005).
17The top four donors are the United States, Britain, Germany, and France.
18The current tensions between Japan and the United States over the relocation of the U.S. Marine
Corps Futenma Air Station in Okinawa prefecture are a case in point.
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